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The way people interact can be examined by looking at the way they move relative to
each other. Seeking the principles behind those interactions have consequences potentially
related to any type of interpersonal function, far beyond the so-called “motor” processes
typically associated with the study of movements, be it perceptive, cognitive, affective,
pragmatic, or epistemic. Here, we present the way the framework of coordination
dynamics deﬁne and addresses the interactive actions in a dyad. We ﬁrst introduce
the basics of pattern formation as the roots of the theoretical approach of coordination
dynamics, and then the way this framework may contribute to establish a solution to
classify behaviors. Thereafter we review promising empirical results on the dynamics
of interpersonal coordination, and ﬁnally discuss were to go next to decipher the way
the coordination between two people and the way each individual contribute may be
disentangled.
Keywords: coordination dynamics, perception–action coupling, asymmetric roles, creation of information,
taxonomy
INTRODUCTION
The way the current results of research on social coordination
belonging to the framework of coordination dynamics are pre-
sented and discussed in this paper is the outcome of numerous
interactions with close collaborators over the past years. At the
same time the author cannot escape being the sole responsible for
every statementwritten here. The present paper aims at identifying
essential solutions and outstanding challenges in understanding
the interaction between people from within the theoretical and
experimental framework of the coordination dynamics approach.
However, to begin with, in a provocative and hopefully not too
unusual tone, I will dwell in here a little by developing this basic
standpoint of the author. These two ﬁrst sentences above intro-
duce the idea of an individual∼others couple, which, even if itmay
appear far-fetched, relates to the general purpose of this paper and
in particular to the discussions reached in its ﬁnal part. Taking a
short cut1 they address the question about the separation between
the author and its collaborators.
This separation may come to asking where “I” do start and
end, how do I know who I am without an observer and by def-
inition perturbing eye, could it be said that I exist outside my
relation to the other(s), or here is another one: what is different
between you and me, I mean really different? Descartes aimed at
solving a related question exerting his doubt to decide what could
ground the very possibility of his existence. Within the bound-
aries he chose to deﬁne the problem and the method, nothing
could resist his own doubt but that he was actually thinking. The
1It is fair to remark that being is identiﬁed here with public statements, in a sense
denoting a very behavioral posturewhich could rise awhole set of criticisms, and that
the separation self∼others is speciﬁcally generated by the institutional individual
responsibility belonging to the act of formulating public statements.
fact that he was thinking provided him with a proof about his
own existence, no less and no more. It is beyond the scope of the
present paper of course to analyze the philosophical validity of this
demonstration, and also to present the many challenging and dis-
puted views this rationale triggered. It is said bymany however that
the famous cogito gave shape and momentum to deleterious con-
ceptions, giving rise to some sort of separation between the brain,
the body, the mind. As neurosciences evolve it becomes more and
more clear that understanding the relation between those entities
is still among the most ambitious enterprises. One could add on
the list the understanding of the relations between the individual
and its environment, physical and social. Anyway on the long run,
I wonder whether considering “I am” as Monsieur Descartes did
will prove the right starting point to deﬁne the existence of homo
sapiens, or coming back to a scientiﬁc level of analysis, to under-
stand the lawfulness of his/her behavior, and of the functioning
of his/her brain. Therefore one may include individual and oth-
ers in the realm of things difﬁcult but necessary to relate; that
might even be a prerequisite to understand some basic cognitive
functions, beyond the one related to the large class of communica-
tive acts. Here I will present a framework that is involved in the
search for basic understanding of the relation between humans,
starting from the relation between their movements. However this
framework is not restricted to movement generation and con-
trol understood as “motor,” it has implications for perception,
cognition, rehabilitation of the so-called social disabilities, and
learning.
THE FRAMEWORK OF ELEMENTARY COORDINATION
BEHAVIOR
Incredibly complex systems like a performing athlete display a
high degree of spatial and temporal order between its components;
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hence it may be essentially captured by composite, higher order
variables. It has been shown that some of these variables are not
mere post hoc idealizations; they follow the tendencies of the
various components (limbs, muscles) to organize their motions
in relation to each other and form patterns of behavior (Turvey,
1990; Kelso, 1995). Coordination is often said to be the rule and
not the exception in biological systems, and is surely leading the
game in perceptivo-motor problems we solve every half a sec-
onds in our daily life. The most obvious such patterns, because
they belong to overt directly measurable behaviors, originate in
interlimb coordination (walking, standing, reaching, chewing, and
speaking). Those patterns are best described by temporal, spatial,
or forces and torques relations, they share the very helpful char-
acteristic of being much lower dimensional than the multitude of
the components they gather.
Many authors have contributed to develop a theoretical and
empirical framework to explain how coordination patterns arise,
since the pioneers (Bernstein, 1967; Kugler et al., 1980), to the
most modern developments (Kelso, 1995; Haken, 1996; Jirsa and
Kelso, 2004), notably assuming a key role for self-organized emer-
gence in brain and behavior. Most of the time, this framework is
referred to as coordination dynamics. It addresses coordination
between joints, between limbs and environment, like the synchro-
nization to a beat, and more recently the coordination between
people.
Basic ingredients of the framework are the following: compo-
nents are interacting via couplings, the couplings cause the increase
of the order between the components, up to the stabilization of
patterns. The components can be joints, also muscles, and the
patterns are very often, but not restricted to in principle, tim-
ing relations between joints movements. Sources of couplings are
manifold. It can be functional exchanges between neural assem-
blies, interaction torques between joints, or of a perceptual basis,
consider for instance how vision can provide relative information
when I try to put a thread through a needle’s hole. The most
well understood elementary coordination is bimanual coordina-
tion. When asked to oscillate the index ﬁngers people are able
to establish and maintain two patterns of motion, either ﬂexing
and extending simultaneously the two ﬁngers, or in opposite way.
The ﬁrst pattern, sometimes described as mirror movements, is
measured by a phase difference close to 0 radians, in-phase, while
the second is measured by an anti-phase difference (pi radians).
When the rate of movement is increased only the in-phase pattern
can be maintained, if intended, the anti-phase pattern is sponta-
neously abandoned and the in-phase is adopted instead. The way
this change operates has deep theoretical consequences. Haken
et al. (1985) assumed that those coordinations obeyed the laws
of pattern formation, designed originally for large scale systems
in statistical physics. They predicted that the change of pattern
corresponded to a phase transition encountered in physics, and
thus should operate by a loss of stability of the intended anti-
phase pattern. This prediction has been veriﬁed experimentally,
and further developments taking into account biological noise led
to stochastic predictions (e.g., critical ﬂuctuations, ﬁrst passage
time, correlations), and again to converging evidence (Schöner
et al., 1986). This initial round of theoretical predictions and cru-
cial experiments, exotic as it was at the time in this ﬁeld, shake the
theory of biological control of movement inspired by cybernetic
and computer program metaphors. Self-organization can work.
Additional astonishing support for the validity of this approach
comes from related experiments in bimanual coordination, this
time examining the organization behind the coordination of index
ﬁngers moving at different frequencies (Kelso and DeGuzman,
1988; Beek, 1989; DeGuzman and Kelso, 1991; Peper et al., 1995).
The stable frequency ratios between left and right hand oscilla-
tory movements that a human can establish correspond quite
closely to the famous Arnold’s tongues discovered for celestial
mechanics. Those ratios belongs to the set of rational number
corresponding to quotient of integers; a seemingly wild biologi-
cal zoo however well predicted by the one-dimensional circle map
model.
In the same vein as in statistical physics, the patterns arise from
interacting components. Those comprise minimally here the indi-
vidual’s ﬁnger movements, but also the muscles, and spinal–brain
neural ensembles related to each ﬁnger. Onemay think about com-
ponents in terms of functional units, which can operate at various
scales. The patterns are low dimensional, in that they require one
or few coordinates to be described, that is, to deﬁne the state space
onto which their dynamics can unfold. The dynamics can then
be tracked down and modeled at the level of the patterns. Like in
previous modeling of phase transitions, there is a deep relation
between the high dimensional behavior of the system taken as a
whole, and the low dimensional evolution of the patterns. The
components are said to be“enslaved”by the patterns; approaching
of the tipping point of change the pattern is losing its stability, its
dynamics slows down, while the components are kept stable. A
stable state possesses fast dynamics, practically a short relaxation
time. These changes and contrast of stability impose a separa-
tion of time scales, which confer to the slowly evolving pattern
the lead of the whole dynamics (see Figure 1). Those proper-
ties are generic around bifurcations in low dimensional dynamical
systems, and correspond to the operation of the center manifold
theorem,widely used to reduce thedimensionof largedimensional
problems to make then tractable.
The mapping of the dynamics onto those low dimensional
attractors remains non-intuitive for many when applied to inten-
tional systems like animals or humans. The friendly skeptics reduce
this phenomenological modeling to a default practical solution to
an otherwise intractable problem. This is a clear misunderstand-
ing. We are beyond a practical way out complexity: the patterns
are real, in that their stability is real and can be directly measured
experimentally, and their formation is thus real, as much as any-
thing else in science can be. This does not mean that the laws of
coordination are not abstract, as we would see later, but to me real
and abstract are two completely incommensurate properties. The
proponents of so-called materially grounded models often end up
relying on a mechanical level of description. Why not if the empir-
ical evidence calls for it and the corresponding driving theory
pushes us forward, but it is to my understanding completely mis-
guided to conceive mechanical laws as less abstract than any other.
Are not the conservation laws explained by abstract symmetry
properties, demonstrated by the famous Noether’s theorem?
The emphasis in this framework is given to the formation of
those patterns. It entails that a pattern of behavior has to be, by
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the principle of
decomposition between coordination variables and components
variables. Coordination patterns emerge from the cooperation between
components of a smaller scale; once formed these patterns constraint the
evolution of lower scales (see Kelso, 1995; Haken, 1996). Couplings among
components determine the cooperation. In the lower panel the meaning of
the graphical signs used in the higher panel is presented.
the same mechanisms, established and maintained continuously,
in particular to resist external perturbations or internal biologi-
cal noise. There is another contribution to disorder, apart from
noise, with which we will end up this introductory short course
on coordination dynamics. The establishment of pattern has to
oppose a very general contribution to disorder: the asymmetry
of components. Some components can be faster than others for
instance, or have more inertia than others. This asymmetry, again
this reasoning is grounded on very generic principles, leads to a
reduction of stability and eventually requires to be opposed by
stronger coupling to maintain the pattern. They may well lead to
a brake down of the pattern, then to a change to another pattern if
available and goal relevant, or to disorder, error, and failure of any
kind. But think about it, in a system like a brain, if homogeneity
was the rule, then trivial ensemble synchrony would be manda-
tory, and not much could arise apart from epileptic seizure. If the
same logic was applied to groups of individuals, I guess we would
also form a boring crowd, may be identically lethal, for we would
be too similar to each other.
As a supplementary note, it is wrong to conﬁne those processes
to low level brain mechanisms, like “motor system,” or to bottom
up, or unconscious, or automatic processes. This approach can be
widely applied to a variety of functions, and is much more speciﬁc
then a “bottom up” type of brain processes.
A CLASSIFICATION OF BEHAVIORS
A key unresolved issue in behavioral sciences and neurosciences
is to classify tasks and more importantly related behaviors. We
use various tasks in our experiments, obtain similar or seemingly
distinct results, but we lack a fundamental classiﬁcation tool, in the
same vein as the classiﬁcation of atomic elements by Mendeleev.
Without this breakthrough, we cannot even clearly generalize ours
results to some class or set of behaviors, or understand why two
experiments studying apparently similar processes failed to get
identical results. Some propose that processes are task speciﬁc;
however such a position is aimless until unequivocal principles to
sort those tasks would be available. Once further advanced, this
issue will not represent anymore such a crucial limitation to our
understanding of individual and interpersonal behaviors. Basically
a researcher may ﬁnd a slight value in understanding what he/she
means by using the words “distinct,” or “similar.” This may sound
overly provocative, but past and current research faces a real issue
right here. In this section some steps toward a clariﬁcation are
presented, though dramatically incomplete respective to the grand
challenge faced.
What are the variables controlled by the central nervous system
(CNS)? Note that what is meant here by the utterance “variables
controlled,” despite its very common use, depends on what is your
preferred theoretical inclination, it could be understood either
directly in a control theoretic, cybernetic framework, or with a
different ﬂavor, according to a theory of emergence of patterns.
In the latter one may speak about “control without a controller,”
and of “effective variables,” typically the ones deﬁning the pat-
terns, hence the variables for which the current intended function
requires stabilization. Those are the variables that bifurcate when
a control parameter is varied, from disorder to order or vice versa,
or between states in multistable dynamics (walking–running).
Gentile (1998) distinguishes various stages during learning,
here what may be to retain is “the content of each stage,” mean-
ing what is learned. She proposes that ﬁrstly the “topology” of
the movement is acquired, deﬁned as the gross spatial pattern,
using the intuitively formulated concept of invariance, pervasive to
the study of biological movement, since at least Bernstein (1967).
At a second stage she identiﬁes the ﬁne tuning of force, mainly
understood at the joint level (torques). The acquisition of a spa-
tial pattern precedes the ﬁne tuning of forces, hence is assumed
a time hierarchy between goal successes enabled by the acqui-
sition of the gross approximation of coordination and by ﬁne
control. This distinction overlaps with another one, which dis-
tinguishes the acquisition of a spatial pattern of the movement
of the end-effector from the acquisition of ﬁne control at the
joints level. Note that most often the end-effector is concerned
directly with the task’s goal, whether it is in terms of spatial or
temporal accuracy, it may also includes (Newtonian) dynamics
requirements (forces, compliance) especially when the physical
interaction with objects is involved. Please note that a similar dis-
tinction has being framed in ideomotor theories, which states that
the effect of actions, or ﬁnal goal, but not the actual effectors is
relevant for the control (Hommel, 1993; Prinz, 1997). Another
classiﬁcation that seems helpful was proposed by Schöner (1995).
He distinguishes tree levels of variables which may be controlled
differently by the CNS. Based mainly on perturbation studies,
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aiming at ﬁnding the invariant properties of movement, he dis-
tinguishes between the timing level, the force (“loads”) level, and
the goal level. Timing refers to the relative time structure between
the limbs motions, hence a relative phasing, which is applica-
ble to both continuous-rhythmic movements and discrete ones.
The timing class also includes timed movements in relation to the
environment, for instance in catching a base ball ﬂying ball, avoid-
ing an obstacle, rowing in synch with teammates. The load level
refers to the invariants properties with respect to force produc-
tion, found with loading perturbation studies, notably following
Feldman (1980) formulation of the equilibrium point theory. The
goal level points at the variables which capture the effect the move-
ment should produce be it a spatial, temporal, or force outcome.
In the self-organization pattern formation framework, the ﬁrst
move was to distinguish and relate the level of the components
and the level of the coordination, which we already presented
brieﬂy above as a basis for our methodology of selection. The
basic empirical evidence and theoretically grounded argument is
that robust effects at the coordination level, concerning essentially
dynamics, can be obtained irrespective to a large set of changes of
the components. This means speciﬁcally the same type and num-
ber of stables patterns, here, phase relations, can be formed and
maintained, and the changes by bifurcation between them, when a
parameter is varied (frequency), are kept invariant despite changes
in the components. Hence the componentsmay differ, but the only
way to get the same coordination dynamics is that the couplings
between these components share some invariance.
In the above attempt of classiﬁcations, invariance is the key.
One aims at ﬁnding what is left invariant after applying a transfor-
mation (perturbation, change of components, coordinate change,
projection, mapping), or a group of such transformations. As we
will see a bit further in the next classiﬁcation, dynamical systems,
here applied to human skilled behavior, naturallymake use of tools
to deﬁne anddetect invariance, for instancewhen identifying states
and bifurcations.
THE CASE FOR TOPOLOGICAL EQUIVALENCE
Jirsa and Kelso (2005) used the deﬁnition of topological equiv-
alence, deﬁned in dynamical systems, to rigorously deﬁne what
makes a difference qualitative and not only quantitative. They
studied simple movements, periodic or discrete at the end-effector
level of individual limb. To get a tractable problem, they studied
a case with only two dimensional dynamics; hence it corresponds
to what is called a two dimensional phase ﬂow. When two classes
deﬁne two qualitatively distinct skills, the intersection between
the sets of these two classes is necessary empty. Moreover, there
exists a type of mapping, deﬁned under topological rules (to keep
it very simple: one can stretch, bend, twist but not cut; topol-
ogy in this domain is sometimes pictured as the “rubber sheet”
geometry), within elements of one class but not between elements
of two classes (the Hartman–Grobman theorem). If the topol-
ogy changes between two phase ﬂows with a continuous change
in one parameter, one can say that a bifurcation occurred. Again
this is a qualitative change, and not simply a matter of quan-
titative change, like scaling for instance. In the case of a two
dimensional state space (deﬁned by position and velocity coor-
dinate), one theorem states that only ﬁxed point (when stable
corresponds to a stationary value in one coordinate in the phys-
ical space of the laboratory), limit cycle (a periodic evolution of
one coordinate in physical space), and separatrix, are possible
(the Bendixon–Poincaré theorem). A separatrix is a portion of
the state space at which the trajectories diverge, because they are
attracted in two opposite directions. Strong empirical evidence
for the existence of this separatrix in the context of a reaction time
task has being recently provided (Fink et al., 2009). Note that here
topology encompasses a body of concepts and mathematics in the
dynamical systems ﬁeld, which may at times, differs signiﬁcantly
from the rather vague, but still intuitive and heuristic, use of the
term by Bernstein and many of his followers. Armed with these
basic topological considerations, one is able a priori to classify
and then identify from empirical data certain elementary classes
of movement, essentially the class of so-called discrete move-
ment, and the class of so-called continuous movement. Moreover
these classes of equivalence point to classes of models which
could reproduce the observations. Recently these tools enabled the
identiﬁcation of primitives belonging respectively to the class of
discrete and continuous movements in simple periodic movement
(Huys et al., 2008), and in a reciprocal pointing task (Huys et al.,
2010).
The distinct status of components and coordination implies
the possibility that exchange between components do not affect,
to some extent, the coordination. This property has been some-
times called “motor equivalence,” and was interpreted as a degree
of abstractness of skills with respect to the speciﬁc implemen-
tation, for instance which limb is used. The famous example is
that one can draw his/her name in the sand with the hand or
with the foot. In the same vein, learning timing relations between
two arms is transferred to two legs and vice versa (Kelso and
Zanone, 2002). This “exchangeability” property, conservation of
the macroscopic coordination ensuring the function despite com-
ponents changes, is also termed sometimes termed degeneracy.
Edelman and Gally (2001) proposed that degeneracy is ubiquitous
at all levels of organization of biological systems: “unlike redun-
dancy, which occurs when the same function is performed by
identical elements, degeneracy, which involves structurally differ-
ent elements, may yield the same or different functions depending
on the context in which it is expressed.” Using group symme-
try arguments, Golubitsky et al. (1999) (see Schöner et al., 1990)
have shown that a whole class of speciﬁc neurophysiological sys-
tems can produce the same set of locomotion behaviors in various
species, as long as they satisfy symmetric requirements. This
means that the same behaviors can be achieved adaptively by a
family of systems of interacting components. Recently, based on
the same classiﬁcation approach, Turvey et al. (2009) have shown
that the way we measure distance by the use of our locomo-
tor motion is determined by gait symmetry. Interestingly, Marey
(1873) analyzed the coordination between two humans walking
one closely following the other, and found that the single animal
quadruped gaits are spontaneously adopted (see also Harrison
and Richardson, 2009), hence the vast ensemble of group the-
oretic predictions for quadrupeds could be tested in a dyadic
scheme in future experiments. Another validation of this abstract
level of analysis came recently from the study of the move-
ments of three people in a sport context, showing interacting
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dynamics well predicted by group theoretic arguments (Yokoyama
and Yamamoto, 2011). More generally, those challenging current
directions demonstrate again that climbing up the abstractness
tree is not the ethereal grail of some remote scientist, but is
practically useful, as it enables to model and predict natural pro-
cesses despite an incomplete knowledge of various underlying
components of the processes studied (Golubitsky and Stewart,
2006).
INCURSIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS
The relevance of movements involved in social behaviors is of
course not restricted to humans. Fentress and colleagues ana-
lyzed quite completely the interaction between wolves in ritual’s
ﬁghts (Moran et al., 1981). They found that sequences of clearly
identiﬁed rotations and maintained distance between two animals
formed a sort of syntax of relativemotions, serving the recognition
of roles played in the group. The way humans interact with others,
the many purposes it may serve, is attracting a growing interest
in behavioral sciences and neurosciences. The way we perceive
other’s movement, how one can learn from observing another
person, how we interpret others’ intentions, the role of seen ges-
tures in communication, all of these issues relate to the interaction
between individuals. However that in many cases, the question
asked is about an observer of another person’s actions, and notice
this is not interaction per se.
The way people interact jumped in the scope of coordination
dynamics ﬁrstly to demonstrate how abstract the laws governing
behaviors can be. Schmidt et al. (1990) ran a series of experiments
asking two participants to swing periodically a pendulum while
looking at each other. They actually found in this new problem
all the hallmarks of bimanual coordination: bistable dynamics,
bifurcation, critical ﬂuctuations, and the like. This demonstrated
that bimanual coordination laws are not the mere consequences
of biomechanical or musculo-skeletal determiners, but can also
be ruling when visual perception is the medium of the coupling.
Therefore those laws are informational (Schöner and Kelso, 1988;
Schöner, 1991; Kelso, 1994; Warren, 2006). Please note that in par-
allel several distinct frameworks have been developed and applied.
One direction taken is to relate social coordination and commu-
nicative acts and related functions by addressing the so-called
grounding problem. Imitation and early social interaction may
offer an exit to the emergence of initial primitives required for the
generative function of language. Another one is aimed at relating
the framework presented here to the timely fashionable concept
of embodiment of cognition (see, for example, Oullier and Basso,
2010). Furthermore one can cite the main concurrent approaches,
in particular the theory of mind (TOM; Frith and Frith, 2003),
but also the joint action theory (Knoblich and Jordan, 2003), or
the extension of the internal model framework from individual’s
movement to social interactive movements (Wolpert et al., 2003).
In the two latter approaches prediction and anticipation of actions
and decisions of others may be put forward as clearly comple-
mentary to a dynamical system account of social coordination.
A dynamical system approach rests upon the instantaneous for-
malization provided by differential calculus, even seldom delayed
differential equations have been used (see for a speciﬁc application
to dyadic coordination Varlet et al., 2012). Arguably the challenge
of anticipation in dynamical systems of human coordination, indi-
vidual or social, which may minimally be deﬁned as the state of the
system under study at time (t) being determined (at least partly)
by the state at time (t + tau), that is, the physicist abhorred
causal inﬂuence of future onto present, remains to the best of
our knowledge untouched. A throughout discussion about the
theme of prediction is excluded here, however one may remember
that dynamical systems are based on predictive assumption and a
prediction objective, this corresponds to the program of formaliz-
ing determinism, originating with celestial mechanics. Put simply
an evolution law acting upon a state space, be it for instance a
large scale neural network underlying movement coordination,
gives rise to a ﬂow, a correspondence between a set of initial con-
ditions and time evolving trajectories. Once the ﬂow is given,
a speciﬁc trajectory can be predicted given an initial condition;
hence the future up to inﬁnity is predicted. Please note that some
authors may consider that the network, along with its dynamics
(ﬂow), represents the function for the organism, but this use of
the word representation, Y stands for X, seems here abusive (see
on this topic the recent work on neural population dynamics by
Churchland et al., 2012). The trick is, based on an instantaneous
step by step prediction, say differently the immediate future being
a function of current state, the whole future is obtained. Now
when noisy ﬂuctuations are introduced, determinism is obtained
at the level of densities probability functions, not of single realiza-
tions (Gardiner, 1990). This is the mathematical textbook saying,
applications to human coordination of course require some wis-
dom to impose boundary conditions, and the formal inﬁnity
must be dropped, with good care like in any other applications,
when one deals with actual individuals and experimental data. A
third category of complementary frameworks correspond to the
application of concepts and theorems from game theory, includ-
ing Von Neuman’s minimax theorem and Nash’s equilibrium
(Nash, 1950; see, for example, Braun et al., 2009, and references
therein).
TRACKING THE ONSET OF SYNCHRONIZATION BETWEEN
PEOPLE
Next step was to turn the enquiry toward the core of social coordi-
nation dynamics. What could we learn from here? How much akin
to synchronize we are, or state differently: how little is required
to get our movement coordinated? Oullier et al. (2008) aimed at
tracking in real time the onset of social coordination. To this end,
the visual coupling between participants (i) was turned off, by
keeping eyes closed, and then (ii) on, eyes open, while through-
out the trial they were asked to oscillate their index ﬁnger “as if
they had to do it the whole day.” Clearly, initially separated move-
ments, in frequency and phase, rapidly converged after the visual
exchange was on, to reach a synchronization state. Depending on
initial condition at the onset of the visual exchange, in-phase or
anti-phase pattern were adopted. In the third stage of the trial, the
coupling was turned off by closing again the eyes, and the syn-
chronized behavior dissolved, ﬁrst the phases unlocked, then the
frequencies slowly diverged, each participant continuing to move
at a frequency close to the one adopted during the encounter.
This simple experiment demonstrated that a collective behavior is
very easily adopted, even without been instructed to voluntarily
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synchronize with the partner. The frequency of the intrinsic, spon-
taneously adopted, oscillatory movement during the eyes closed
stage is sufﬁciently similar between two individuals to have a
spontaneous mutual entrainment, giving rise to clear cut syn-
chronization. Many features predicted by the theory of coupled
oscillators were made quantiﬁable at the scale of the empirical
observation, thanks to the possibility to manipulate the coupling
medium, which is not so easily possible in interlimb coordination
in one individual.
One question relevant to the newborn social neurosciences
rapidly made its way once this paradigm was established. Given
the frustrating difﬁculty to address a truly interactive situation
between humans, it was still unresolved whether our brain activ-
ity was speciﬁc or not to those elementary epochs of synchrony
between people. Building a dual electroencephalographic (EEG)
recording set-up, and using a liquid crystal display to turn on
and off the visual coupling from the movement of the partner,
we were able to identify speciﬁc brain dynamics that correlated
with effective synchrony (Tognoli et al., 2007). By comparing the
EEG oscillatory content, at a very ﬁne grain resolution, corre-
sponding to epochs of spontaneous synchrony and epochs in
which synchrony was not established while visual coupling was
also present; we found systematic changes in the alpha band in
right centro-parietal area. This study certainly gave the lead to
the systematic investigation of interactive brains, which hope-
fully will further our deﬁnitions and understanding of various
phenomena relevant to inter-individual behaviors, like resonance,
mirroring, mimicry, symmetry breaking, agency and self-other
discrimination, or attachment and rapport, to name but a few.
One direction of research is to bridge the gap between the frame-
work used in those studies and the mirror neurons and mirror
network found in monkeys and humans. The now very famous
discovery by Rizzolati and colleagues consisted in ﬁnding neu-
rons in the premotor cortex responsive both when executing a
speciﬁc action and when observing another individual executing
the same action (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992). Neurons charac-
terized by the same responsiveness were found in single cells
recording in other areas, while later in humans brain imaging stud-
ies showed what was interpreted as a large scale mirror system,
and more recently intra-cranial recordings in epilepsy patients
revealed neurons with the same speciﬁc action dependency ﬁring
while executing or observing (see the research work by Mukamel
et al., 2010). How this ﬁts with the framework used here and the
results obtained, or may be more efﬁciently one can ask what
could be the role of the mirror neurons in mutual synchroniza-
tion? The mirror neurons are implied in both perception, and
in movement execution, thus naively one may assume they may
support the coupling function between self-movement and the
other’s proposed in the present approach. Some authors reject
their mirroring function and replace it by a simple acquired
perception–movement mapping, which could correspond to a
coordinate frame change, like it is classically assumed in compu-
tational models of sensorimotor functions within an individual.
Again the concept of a coupling can also account for this inter-
pretation of the role of mirror neurons (please note that mapping
and coupling here address two distinct levels of analysis). What
remains is the action speciﬁc property of the mirror neurons.
It is hard to conceive an action speciﬁc coupling, or the func-
tion of this coupling would be not to represent the observed
movement but to select the proper intrinsic dynamics available
in the repertoire of the observer matching the one observed.
To address those questions, one may aim at extending the Tog-
noli et al.’s (2007) experiment to the coordination of two distinct
movements. Minimally it seems readily feasible to address the
coordination of one discrete and one continuous movement with-
out losing the power and the current framework, but other
type of differences between observed and executed movement
patterns may have to be envisioned. To close this part, one can-
not resist but evoking the studies showing how basic rhythmic
behaviors, basically the actions implying a sensorimotor coupling
with a periodic event in the environment, like the one introduc-
ing originally the present framework of coordination dynamics,
are very likely to be originally acquired through social encoun-
ters (Kirschner and Tomasello, 2009; Wiltermuth and Heath,
2009).
SYNCHRONY IS A PROCESS AND A SOLUTION
Synchronization is ubiquitous, rather well deﬁned in terms of
model and measurement, and its role in biology as long fasci-
nated researchers (Wiener, 1948; Winfree, 1967; Kelso, 1995). But
what could be its functional relevance, or ecological relevance?
We can ﬁnd very adaptive to step together when required, dur-
ing metro rush hours of commuting, and this strong tendency
can also become catastrophic (Moussaïd et al., 2011). In humans
or animals, collective behaviors are suggested to increase sensory
range (Couzin, 2009), and may serve visual attention. How-
ever collective behavior can prove difﬁcult to relate to individual
behavior (Gallup et al., 2012). Here is further food for thoughts
coming from the study of brain networks dynamics. It is pro-
posed that synchrony between localized emergent oscillations in
the brain is away to solve the binding problemof integrating segre-
gated sensory features (Gray et al., 1989; von der Malsburg, 1994).
Interareal coherence would serve information exchange between
neurons and between neurons populations (Bressler et al., 1993).
Clearly in this case synchrony reﬂects the exchange of information,
because it necessarily depends upon coupling, given the asymme-
try and noisy behaviors of components involved. But synchrony
is likely to enable the proper timing of incoming ﬂow of spiking
activity relative to the most excitable times of local ongoing activ-
ities (Sejnowski and Paulsen, 2006; Senkowski et al., 2008). This
way synchrony may strengthen the communication, making the
receiving neurons more sensitive to incoming streams of spikes
(Sejnowski and Paulsen, 2006).
There are other cases where the purpose of synchronization is
intriguing. Consider a dancing couple. Sometimes one leads the
other, but at the same time must keep up with the partner. Being
an absolute beginner, I vividly remember how trying to teach me
the basics of tango a female partner, by letting herself being guided,
somewhat guided me to take over the lead. Here synchrony is a
process, it has to be established, and a medium, in that it serves a
purpose. By being selectively responsive tomy leadingmovements,
she reinforced my leading role. But who was leading?
I will draw now a provocative analogy. This type of leader–
follower dynamics was seemingly operating in the dyad composed
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by a horse and his rider in simple seated trot dressage (Lagarde
et al., 2005). We found evidence for an increase of synchrony
between a highly trained rider and an equivalently highly trained
horse when compared to the pair formed by an intermediate level
rider and the same horse. What can we learn from this exam-
ple? First take into account that this type of horse is extremely
sensitive to any movement of the rider, through any surface con-
tacts, mouth, legs, reins, stirrups, etc. . .. Obviously the aim of
the rider is to control the horse, and we found evidence for a
decrease of variability of the horse’s periods at maximal vertical
extensions when ridden by the expert. That was precisely at those
times that the intermediate rider synchronization to the horse ver-
tical movement proved loose. In the same move the rider intend
to get in sync with the horse and to controls the horse. Can we
disentangle the two? What are the ingredients of this particular
system? First the fact that the surface of contacts are bidirec-
tional sensory interfaces, each one feels the other movements.
Second that the rider cannot escape from adapting to the horse’s
movements. Now if one aims at controlling, what matters are per-
turbing movements, that is, movements that introduce a change
in the current state of affairs, a surprise, or in other words what
can be considered as information. But those perturbing move-
ments have to be intended, not the result of being somewhat
passively shaken by the horse. For the rider to produce mean-
ingful information a background of synchrony is welcome: by
tightly following the horse the slightest deviation becomes rel-
evant. The mutual coupling between the rider and the horse
can be emblematic of the king of ampliﬁcation process synchro-
nization may offer, in a dyad of mutually perceiving and acting
partners.
FURTHER OUTSTANDING CHALLENGES
To close this short piece I will browse a short list of ques-
tions speciﬁc to social coordination waiting to be unveiled. The
ﬁrst issue relates to deciphering the speciﬁc information which
is mediated by the coupling between individual’s movements.
When one’s actions are determined by what he/she feels, hears
or sees another person or a group of other person’s movements,
is the information preferentially picked up speciﬁc to: single joint,
pattern between joints, or end-effector (Varlet et al., 2011)? Sec-
ond and related topic relates to the sensory modalities through
which this coupling may be conveyed. It becomes increasingly
clear that the ability to integrate or segregate the senses is key to
adapted behavior, and that its disturbance may be conducive to
a range of pathology. The senses within an individual presents
asymmetries in their physiological properties and ecological uses
that tailor their coordination dynamics, leading to favored or
instead unstable behavior, in particular to deﬁne the boundaries
between temporal and spatial fusion and segregation (Lagarde
and Kelso, 2006; Lagarde et al., 2012; Zelic et al., 2012). What
is the role of multisensory integration in the context of inter-
personal coordination? Agency, motor resonance, out of body
experience extended to another’s body (Farrer and Frith, 2002;
Keysers and Gazzola, 2009; Blanke, 2012; Tajadura-Jiménez et al.,
2012), all appear to rely on multisensory integration phenom-
ena. Another promising challenge is to close the gap between the
present framework and a game theoretic framework to account
for similar elementary cooperative behaviors (Braun et al., 2009),
and to provide a general taxonomy of such behaviors (see the
propositions along those lines by Jarrassé et al., 2012), possibly
by developing a framework as complete as the one employing
topological equivalence presented above. Thirdly there is a need
to understand whether or not the synchronization between two
persons possesses a special status among social coordinative behav-
iors. We have brieﬂy reviewed the current framework which
describes in most details and most parsimonious way the forma-
tion of coordination phenomena. This framework in particular
explain how a generic collapse of dimension arises each time
a pattern is formed. Does this collapse of dimensions, to cari-
cature, it could be sometimes said in dyadic coordination that
one + one = one, have a particular meaning for humans? Is
that the reason why such coordination episodes may affect the
relation between two individuals, facilitating the communication
for instance? This touches the question of the remnant of the
coordination episode, its impact onto the individuals. This is key
and at the same time may pose a difﬁcult challenge. In Figure 1
the general framework of synergetics and coordination dynamics
is presented, and all the efforts to date have been put to pro-
pose the most general framework, yet able to generate empirically
testable questions, explaining how coordination is formed. This
entails in particular detailing how the system effective behav-
ior changes from a high dimension to a lower dimension state.
But consider now that the components interest us above all other
things; this is plainly evident in a rehabilitation for social behav-
ior context for instance. We really have in this case to analyze
and model how the coordination level “feeds back” to the com-
ponents. Oullier et al. (2008) found a sort of primitive social
memory, the intrinsic preferred pace of the participants changed,
at least transiently, after its spontaneous adjustment during the
coordination stage with the partner thanks to mutual entrain-
ment. This indicates a slow time scale dynamics operating at the
level of the components. There are many straightforward ways in
which this slow change could be introduced in the models, but
one may wonder how deep the consequences would be for the
whole framework, this feature of the components would prevent
part of the elimination of dimension procedure which ensures the
success.
Fourth and in relation to the third point, to contribute further
to writing down the principles of interpersonal coordination, a
clearer view about the role “symmetric” and “asymmetric” rela-
tions would be probably very informative (Boker and Rotondo,
2002). Here symmetric have to be understood as referring to
the structure and intrinsic dynamics of the components, not
the behavior. Symmetry between the intrinsic dynamics and the
couplings of two individuals will give rise to synchronization,
and possibly out of phase synchronization by half a period shift
(Golubitsky and Stewart, 2006). However departure from symme-
try can to some extent give also rise to behavioral synchronization.
It would be very interesting to decipher the role played by asym-
metric individual in a coordination task. Many measures ensuring
the descriptions of those coordinations are relations, be it phase
differences, or distances, thus are degenerate. As a consequence
one cannot easily single out the contribution of the individual’s
behavior within a pair. One way to overcome such limitation is to
Frontiers in Neurorobotics www.frontiersin.org October 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 18 | 7
“fnbot-07-00018” — 2013/10/9 — 21:23 — page 8 — #8
Lagarde Social coordination dynamics
use asymmetric measures, the so-called causality measures, rarely
used in behavioral sciences, for instance information transfermea-
sures (De Guzman et al., 2005). These measures can potentially, in
particular in the case of imperfect and dyadic coordination, indi-
cate when one individual is more inﬂuenced by the other. To this
aim, but in terms of experimental paradigm, another way to break
the symmetry of measures and protocols is by use of the con-
cept of the human clamp project, the virtual interacting partners
(VPI; Kelso et al., 2009). By manipulating the parameters, intrinsic
dynamics, and coupling function, of an artiﬁcial interacting agent,
one may reveal hidden properties of the human actor. Kelso et al.
(2009) judiciously reversed the coupling functionwithin the artiﬁ-
cial agent, to create a conﬂict between the human and the VPI and
investigate novel phenomena. In the same vein, this insight about
individual’s role within a pair can be examined by breaking the
symmetry of movements, for instance by changing the moment
of inertia of hand oscillated pendulum (Varlet et al., 2012), but
more radical differences can be introduced. A change in one
such parameter stands either for a quantitative change, and this
has been investigated in within individual bimanual coordination
and between individuals (Varlet et al., 2012), but also to a more
important qualitative change, as presented in the course of this
paper.
To conclude, and coming back to the introduction, it may
be time that we depart from symmetric coordination, to under-
stand further how we evolve in and out of perfect dyadic
synchronization. As stated in the introductory example, observ-
ing eyes are also perturbing. Coupling is explicitly interpreted
and dealt with by mathematicians as a perturbation of intrin-
sic (isolated) dynamics of the components, hence the presence
of the observer offers a source of potential information creation
(Boker and Rotondo, 2002). The mirror will not tell you much
about yourself, but another person, by deﬁnition different, may
do so.
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